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The Colour of Risk:
An Exploration of the IPCC’s “Burning Embers” Diagram*,
Martin Mahony
Mike Hulme§
This article tracks the historical emergence of a new visual convention
in the representation of the risks associated with climate change. The
“reasons for concern” or “burning embers” diagram has become a
prominent visual element of the climate change debate. By drawing
on a number of cultural resources, the image has gained a level of
discursive power which has resulted both in material mobility and
epistemic transformation as the diagram itself has become a tool for
a variety of actors to reason with. The case brings to light a number
of challenges associated with aempts to know and visualize abstract
concepts such as risk and danger, including the social organisation of
knowledge production and the role of expert judgment in contexts where
science is asked to retreat from normativity.
I. S  
How can climate change be visualized? The anthropogenic modification
of the atmosphere’s radiative properties through the emission of greenhouse
gases and aerosols is an almost impossibly intangible, abstract, and remote
phenomenon, distant in both space and time in many people’s perceptions
(O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). While the human-caused depletion of the
planet’s protective ozone layer became manifest in the figuratively visible
“ozone hole” over the Antarctic, the complex causation and uncertain present
and future impacts of climate change have generated “a mess of competing
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visual narratives characterized by suggestive shapes drawn by the ploed
lines of story-laden graphs” (Hamblyn and Callanan 2009, 43). The notion
that graphical representations of climate change are “story-laden” is not
to undermine their relationship to physical realities. Rather it points both
to the social processes of their construction and to their appropriation of
culturally-embedded representational conventions in the ongoing struggle
to render climate change “meaningful” (Schneider 2011; Doyle 2011). While
graphic data representations have proven to be useful heuristics for coming to
terms with the complex dynamics of the atmosphere, photographs have oen
been employed to visualize the possible impacts of climate change. Common
tropes of stranded polar bears, flash flooding and parched soil can be found
accompanying media coverage of climate change (Doyle 2007; Manzo 2010).
Such discursive coupling is suggestive of direct causal relationships between
climate change and the pictured impacts, even as the scientific debate over the
aribution and prediction of extreme weather events appears irresolvable with
any certainty (IPCC 2011).
It is into this representational milieu that the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) introduced the so-called “burning embers” diagram
in 2001 (Figure 1). The diagram seeks to summarise a number of “reasons for
concern” linked to the prospect of rising global temperatures. The le hand side
of the figure, which appeared in theWorking Group II Summary for Policymakers
(2001), shows projections of global mean temperature (GMT) change up to
2100 based on various emissions scenarios and the results of numerous climate
simulations. It is suggested that GMT could rise by up to 6℃ by 2100. The right
hand side of the figure schematically represents the level of danger associated
with these rises in mean temperature above 1990 levels for five categories of
concern. The change in colour from white to yellow to red is taken to denote
risks of increasing magnitude, severity or geographic spread, and it is this colour
palee which gave rise to the moniker “burning embers” among the diagram’s
creators.1
II. T   
In its original form in Chapter 19 of Working Group II’s contribution to the
IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR), the diagram appeared in greyscale (as
did all diagrams in the main body of the report) and laid-out horizontally. This
1 The following discussion is based on interviews with 11 scientists who were involved with
the development of the diagram between 1999 and 2009. The disciplinary backgrounds
and interests of the scientists varied between climate modelling, climate impacts analysis,
economics and ecology. The interviews were conducted between May and December 2011.
Interview data was supplemented by textual analysis of the publications in which the diagram
appeared or was discussed.
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Figure 1. IPCC 2001. Projected temperature changes under different emissions scenarios (le)
and “reasons for concern” or “burning embers” (right).
original version of the diagram was based on months of work by individuals on
the writing team, who assessed the literature on climate change impacts across
the five “reasons for concern.” This categorization of impacts was a result of
earlier deliberations within the team which led to a desire to synthesize the
textual information in the form of an accessible visualization. The diagrammatic
format demanded that projected impacts be tied to specific temperature points
and, as literature on climate change impacts was sparse at the time, the authors
had to exercise personal judgment in determining where the colour shis should
take place.
This kind of risk visualization was not without precedent in the climate
change literature. A decade earlier, Rijsberman and Swart (1990) and Vellinga
and Swart (1991) presented the “traffic light” system of risk visualization and
management (Figure 2). This employed three discrete blocks of colour—green,
amber and red—to represent increasing rates of GMT and sea level rise and their
risk corollaries (although again, printing practices reduced the colours to shades
of grey). The aim of this visual device was to propose targets for temperature
stabilisation. The transition from green to amber occurs with a 1℃ rise above
pre-industrial levels, while the red light is associated with a 2℃ rise. The authors
argue that the:
goal of our effort must be, therefore, to go for the green light,
and in any case, to fully avoid the red light. To avoid the red light
means that we want to limit the GMT rise to well below 2℃ with
respect to the pre-industrial level and that we want to limit the sea
level rise to well below 50cms. (Vellinga and Swart 1991, 131)
This was the first time that maximum temperature change was used as a means
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of normatively framing a target-based approach to global climate policy (cf.
Nordhaus 1977), and was a key moment in the establishment of the 2℃ target
as an anchoring device for scientific and political discussions of climate change
(Randalls 2010).
Figure 2. Vellinga and Swart 1991. The “traffic light” approach to risk management.
Diagrams such as these combine expert judgments of observational evidence,
future predictions, and normative judgments of risk. Unlike quantitative
scientific visualizations which commonly aim at an ideal of unmediated
representation or an “analogue” of physical reality (Daston and Galison 2007;
Barthes 1977), here the viewer’s interpretation is guided explicitly by the design
choices and their aendant normative elements. The desirability of the boom
scenario is prefigured in the green traffic light; likewise the undesirability in the
red. The normative content of the temperature and sea level rise scenarios is
not le to the viewer’s interpretation. The familiarity of the traffic light—and
the images it conjures of momentum continued, tempered or abated—directs
interpretation towards this seductively linear notion of pathways and targets.
This notion has since been criticised for its reductiveness and its tendency to
distract from the politically and ethically complex task of reducing emissions
(Randalls 2010). According to this construction, it is science which is almost
literally directing the traffic and showing the way.
The “traffic lights” had a direct influence on the development of the “burning
embers” diagram. During the early stages of the writing team’s deliberations,
a diagram was proposed which employed a similar transition from green to
red along each “line of evidence” column, as they were known before “reasons
for concern.” However, this palee was dismissed, as it was thought that the
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green element indicated an absence of risk or even safety for some levels of
climate change—something which the authors took as being contrary both to
their own understandings of the risks and to the message they sought to convey
(interview, December 1, 2011). The neutrality of white was thus employed as the
baseline on which to build the negativity of red. The ordering of the columns was
also decided based on a combination of epistemic and aesthetic considerations.
Neither fundamentally scientific nor axiological reasons are given for the
ordering. Rather, this composition was deemed the most visually appealing,
producing an upward-trending diagonal in the emergence of yellow, from
column two to column five (interview, November 4, 2011). It is a graphical design
choice, but one which provides visual and rhetorical echoes of the rising forms
of many high-profile climate visualizations, from Michael Mann’s famously
controversial “hockey stick” temperature chart on the pages of IPCC reports to
Al Gore’s dramatically exponential CO2 concentrations in An Inconvenient Truth
(Hamblyn 2009; Schneider 2011).
As in the “traffic lights,” a sense of danger is pre-figured in the “burning
embers” colour palee. The colour red has been graphically associated with high
temperatures since the nineteenth century (Schneider 2011), but its connotative
associations with danger, fear, violence, and passion have a much longer and
more engrained lineage in Western cultures (Gage 1999). The embeddedness of
this scientific diagramwithin these political discourses and cultural conventions
is the source of its meaning. It is also the locus from which it has achieved
mobility as an actant within the networks which tie together science, politics,
culture and ethics, further blurring their already permeable boundaries while
undergoing a number of epistemic transformations.
III. E 
The “burning embers” diagram achieved a great deal of visibility following
its publication in 2001 and has arguably become one of a few iconic scientific
visualizations giving illustration to the climate change debate (Liverman 2009).2
In a particularly interesting use of the “burning embers” diagram, Mastrandrea
and Schneider (2004) use the image as a foundation for a probabilistic
assessment of the chances of avoiding “dangerous” climate change under certain
2 See, e.g., West Coast Climate Equity, Present targets for CO2 emission cuts
will not prevent a 4C global temperature rise, Last modified July 11, 2010,
westcoastclimateequity.org/2010/07/07/present-targets-for-co2-emission-cuts-will-not-
prevent-a-4c-global-temperature-rise/ ; Greenpeace Australia Pacific, Treading on
burning embers, Last modified September 29, 2009, www.greenpeace.org.au/blog/?p=875;
Climate Change Food Security, Policy making, Last accessed July 27, 2012,
www.climatechange-foodsecurity.org/policy.html; UNEP, Climate Change Science
Compendium 2009, (Nairobi, 2009); and G. Yohe, ‘Reasons for concern’ (about climate
change) in the United States, Climatic Change 99(1-2) (March 2010): 295-302.
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policy initiatives. A cumulative density function of the threshold of dangerous
anthropogenic interference (DAI) is constructed by placing a data point at the
level at which each column turns red (see Figure 3). The authors justify this
strategy by stating that each column represents the judgment of “dozens of
IPCC lead authors’ examination of climate impacts literature,” and therefore
that the red zones represent “a consensus estimate of DAI” (Mastrandrea and
Schneider 2004, 572). The “dangerous” temperature thresholds are then used to
explore the sensitivity of projections of DAI to three model parameters3 enabling
the authors to claim that the probability of DAI can be reduced from around 45
percent to near zero by increasing “policy controls.”
Mastrandrea and Schneider’s analysis transforms the burning embers’
blurred, uncertain judgments of future climate impacts into a quantitative
profile of risk and danger as the global temperature moves up the scale from its
late twentieth century baseline. The temperature thresholds for radical changes
in social and natural systems, drawn initially from climate impacts studies and
then amalgamated and obscured in colour, re-emerge as new points: average
thresholds, calculated not from the collected-together numbers of the impacts
literature, but from the shiing colours of their graphical approximation. Point
becomes blur, blur becomes point.
This epistemic transformation illustrates both the challenges of visualizing
risk, and the power of consensus in addressing complex environmental issues.
The visualization of risk involves not only an aempt to capture and represent
physical processes and phenomena. It also represents their interaction with
social systems, certain interpretations of the meaning of that interaction, and
the social and political capacity to respond to an emerging danger, should
it be deemed to be of sufficient magnitude and urgency. The calculation of
risk is thus oen a task bestowed upon those with the necessary technical
expertise to comprehend the complex,multi-faceted nature of anthropogenically
“manufactured risks” (Giddens 1999). The concept of “risk” itself “has come to
stand as one of the focal points of feelings of fear, anxiety and uncertainty”
pertaining to the future (Lupton 1999, 12). Its calculation must therefore involve
grappling with the epistemological, ontological, and ethical uncertainties which
are constitutive of any effort to project what is known into the future, and then
to draw on such projections to reflect on how society should be directed in
the present (Beck 1992; Felt and Wynne 2007). Such knowledge will always be
incomplete and partial—it will vary between experts, social constituencies, and
cultures (Lupton 1999). The social organisation of knowledge therefore becomes
a key source of epistemic authority, with assessment, synthesis, and consensus
3 The model parameters investigated are the estimated climate sensitivity to a doubling of CO2
concentrations, projected economic damages, and the discount rate, i.e. the way present costs
and benefits are weighed-up against future costs and benefits.
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Figure 3. Schneider and Mastrandrea 2005. Adaptation of the “burning embers” diagram. The
thresholds of dangerous climate change are marked by the black points and connecting line,
positioned where each column begins turning red.
being central strategies for the application of scientific expertise to questions of
societal risk.
The IPCC is mandated to produce consensus. Despite the pursuit of
consensus being arguably “a source of both strength and vulnerability for the
IPCC,” the notion of “consensual science” carries great discursive power in
climate change debates (Hulme and Mahony 2010, 711). For many analysts (e.g.
Edwards and Schneider 1997), the aainment of consensus has been politically
instrumental in convincing the world of the need to act on climate change
and thus for the advancement of international climate policy.4 Consensus
can also be said to be generative of community identities, especially those
articulated around epistemic norms and values (Horst and Irwin 2010; Haas
1992). Although gaining authority through its representation of a form of
consensus, the “burning embers” diagram has not always aracted a broader
consensus beyond the epistemic community which innovated and developed
the diagram.
The IPCC chapter which gave rise to the original “burning embers” was
4 See also D.H. Guston, On consensus and voting in science: From Asilomar to the National
Toxicology Program, in The New Political Sociology of Science: Institutions Networks, and Power,
ed. Sco Frickel and Kelly Moore, 373-404, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006);
and H. Graßl, A discernible human influence on the global climate - How the IPCC affected
climate Politics, GAIA - Ecological Perspectives for Science and Society 18(3) (September 2009):
255-56.
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re-mandated for the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), albeit with many new
authors. Although the “key vulnerabilities” (Schneider et al. 2007) and “reasons
for concern” (IPCC 2007) analytical frameworks persisted and were updated
textually (the laer in the IPCC’s Synthesis Report), the “burning embers”
diagram was absent in the final report. In interviews, authors of the chapter
reported a reluctance to wholly import the analytical framings from the TAR,
as the AR4 team was required to assess a rapidly evolving and expanding
literature. However, towards the end of the writing process, it was decided
amongst some authors that an update to the “burning embers” diagram would
be appropriate. An updated version of the burning embers diagram was thus
presented for inclusion at the Working Group II plenary session. However, the
lack of a version of the diagram in the underlying chapter later opened space
for procedural objections from government delegations, with the late Steve
Schneider, Coordinating Lead Author of the chapter, reporting that “four fossil
fuel dependent countries accepted the text but refused the figure,” seemingly on
the grounds that it was “too much of a judgment” (quoted in Revkin 2009). A
combination of these governmental protestations, the tight timescales of IPCC
draing processes, and certain objections to this particular analytical framing
within the Working Group II hierarchy conspired to see the updated embers
excluded from the AR4. The updated diagram was eventually published by a
group largely consisting of chapter authors in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences (Smith et al. 2009; see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Smith et al. 2009. Updated “Reasons for Concern.”
Schneider’s claim that the diagram represented too much of a “judgment”
for some parties emphasises the challenge of negotiating the boundary between
description and prescription. The preservation of this boundary is inscribed
both in the IPCC’s mandate and in the norms of much contemporary scientific
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practice (Shapin 2008; Walsh 2009). The shi from the le- to the right-hand
side of Figure 4, with the visually striking descent of the red, does not portray a
change in the ontological status of the risks between 2001 and 2009, but rather
maps the changing content of scientific understandings and judgments. The
diagram seeks to represent the consensual amalgamation of these judgments,
and the authors openly relate the potential for subjectivity in this mode of
knowledge production and synthesis (Smith et al. 2009). However, the cognitive
and social-epistemological processes which are generative of such judgments
are largely indiscernible to the outside observer.
IV. A    
The “burning embers” diagram is a collage of space and time (Schneider
2011) with GMT standing in for an indeterminate temporality, while the global
is collapsed into the limited dimensionality of graphematic space. This level
of abstraction has been a source of criticism. For example, Liverman (2009)
argues that the diagram elides the complex geographies of climate change
impacts in its effort to present a globalized conceptual space. The dominant
“global gaze” of climate science is not an epistemological inevitability, but is
rather the result of the complex intertwining of science and politics (e.g. Miller
2004; Oels 2005). For instance, since its inception the “reasons for concern”
framework has sought to address a principle enshrined in Article 2 of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—the avoidance
of “dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system” (UN
1992).
While aempting to avoid overt policy prescriptiveness, the “reasons for
concern” framework has sought to provide illustrative guidance on what might
be considered a dangerous level of global mean temperature rise. However, the
framework seeks to address only the dangers associated with anthropogenic
climate change, rather than those associated with natural climate variability.
For example, it is suggested in all versions of the diagram that at some point
below 1990 temperature levels that the risks associated with extreme weather
events were “virtually” zero or “neutral.” Of course extreme weather happened
long before 1990, but the “reasons for concern” framework seeks to address only
that whichmay be aributable to human actions. This inverse purification of the
“human” from the “natural” (cf. Latour 1993) is a function of the diagram’s direct
engagementwith the policy question of “dangerous anthropogenic interference.”
It thus functions as a heuristic for the dangers associated with an imagined,
human-made climate of linear trends and direct causalities, rather than a
complex, hybrid climate where cycles, trends and social trajectories interact
chaotically in perhaps unknowable ways.5
5 For an example of the political implications of this purification, see M. Hulme, S.J. O’Neill and
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Figure 5. Richardson et al. 2009. The “burning embers” as they appear in Richardson et
al.’s synthesis of an international scientific conference which took place in the run-up to the
Copenhagen climate negotiations of December 2009. The positioning of the “2℃ guardrail” at
around 1.4℃ represents the discrepancy between pre-industrial and 1990 temperature baselines,
the laer being preferred in IPCC assessments.
As an “epistemic thing” (Rheinberger 1997), the “burning embers” diagram
does not simply fulfil a representational role, but rather functions as an object
within a system of enquiry (see for example Figures 3 and 5). However, instead
of Rheinberger’s tightly bounded and regulated laboratory spaces, the “burning
embers” diagram functions in a much wider arena. There the conditions “of
the possibility of things becoming epistemic things” (Rheinberger 1998, 297) are
as much political and discursive as they are determined by the materiality of
scientific enquiry (Jasanoff 2004; Foucault 2007). The “burning embers” diagram
is thus a hybrid form: representational and heuristic, forensic and epideictic;6 the
outcome of an institutionalized, yet indeterminate, encounter between object
and subject. This hybridity, while posing challenges to certain scientific norms,
is emblematic of the complex interweaving of competing epistemologies with
the challenges of intractable uncertainty which characterises late-modern “risk
societies” (Beck 1992).
For theorists such as Ulrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (1991),
industrialized societies are experiencing conditions of late modernity. This
represents a continuation or radicalisation of the institutional, economic, and
cultural changes wrought by modernisation to a point where socioeconomic
S. Dessai, Is weather event aribution necessary for adaptation funding? Science 334(6057)
(November 11 2011): 764-65.
6 See Walsh (2009) for a discussion of climatological imagery through the lens of Aristotelian
rhetoric.
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processes generate hazards of a scale which require modernity to reflect on
itself and to challenge its assumptions of progress and interminable growth.
Late modern societies are preoccupied with the future. This preoccupation
most oen takes the form of the calculation of hazard probabilities and
of the social acceptability of risks in order that they may be managed or
“controlled.” However, late modernity is also characterized by risks of a sort
which belie easy calculation, spatio-temporal delineation or straightforward
democratic appraisal. The blurring colours of the “burning embers” exemplify
this paradoxical societal relationship with risk as an object of scientific enquiry
and political concern.
It is in this societal milieu that the “burning embers” diagram may be said
to function much like an expressionist painting. During the early twentieth
century the expressionist movement pursued an artistic style which prioritised
subjective experience, meaning and emotion in a direct rebual to realist and
naturalist representational paradigms (Wille 1970). Likewise, the “burning
embers” diagram seeks not to figuratively represent a phenomenon (the
changing climate), but rather its intangible effects.7 These effects, be they
heightened levels of danger or risk, are quickly translated into affect through the
use of literary and visual conventions such as the emotionally charged colour
palee. The expressionist movement arose in Germany in part in response to
conditions of social crisis and upheaval (Whitford 1970). The “burning embers”
diagram feeds certain anxieties about the future; we can sense ourselves walking
powerlessly into the red heat, a fate made all the more inevitable as the red zone
creeps towards the colourless safety of the baseline. In the case of this diagram,
scientific visualization is not the disinterested gaze of technical apparatus.
Rather, it is a suite of social-epistemic practices situated firmly within a set
of cultural discourses in the uncertain, reflexive time-space of late modernity.
The semiotic, epistemic and social elements of such constructions cannot be
understood in isolation, or even analytically delineated. Here they are mutually
constitutive, combining and re-combining in a particular graphematic space to
produce a mobile and evolving visual convention.
V. C
This article began by posing the question of how climate change can be
visualized. The example of the “burning embers” diagram itself raises the
question of whether the exercise of subjective expert reasoning is compatible
with the demands of diagrammatic reasoning. It has been argued that the notion
of risk is highly complex in epistemic and normative terms, especially when
7 Coincidentally, one of the most famous examples of expressionist architecture—Erich
Mendelsohn’s Einstein Tower in Potsdam—lies just a few yards from the meeting room where
the burning embers diagram was first conceived by IPCC authors.
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considered in the context of climate change (Hulme 2009). A perfectly “objective”
assessment of the risks posed by a changing climate would be impossible,
and the authors of the “burning embers” diagram are right to acknowledge
the inevitable subjectivity of such judgments. As a heuristic tool, the diagram
functions well in its suggestion of when (or, more precisely, at what temperature)
danger might be encountered under a changing climate, as evidenced by the
variety of uses to which the diagram has been put. As representation, the
diagram is weakened by the opacity of what exactly is being represented. In
the translation from assessment of scientific literature to diagrammatic form, a
wide body of scientific knowledge is condensed into a suggestive array of colour
with the somewhat inevitable loss of what Latour (1999) terms “reference”—the
traces, marks and symbols which tie together mind and world.
Despite the widespread rhetorical policing of the boundary between
description and prescription, this case makes clear that the communication of
climate change through visualization relies not only on translation, but also
on what Walsh (2009) terms a “performance of continuity” across the is/ought
divide. Highlighting the normative underpinnings of this continuity is perhaps
incompatible with the demands of diagrammatic reasoning and the limitations
of graphematic space. Our knowledge of the complexity of the climate system is
growing and different normative stances on climate change are proliferating, for
example in judgements about what might constitute a “key vulnerability.” In this
context, scientists working at the science-policy interface may need to find new,
creative ways of communicating their findings. Recognising and communicating
epistemic uncertainty and normative diversity will be central to the success of
such efforts.
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